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CASE SUMMARIES
CERCLA
GJ. Leasing Company, Inc. v. Union Elec-
tric Company, 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir.
1995)
GJ. Leasing Company brought suit
against Union Electric Company, alleging
ownership liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCIA), 42 U.S.C. §§
9607 (a)(2), (3). G.J. Leasing's predecessor
bought a 52-acre tract with a decommis-
sioned power plant from Union Electric in
1979. GJ. Leasing claimed Union Electric
arranged for or disposed of a hazardous
substance, asbestos, by selling the tract of
land. In addition, G.J. Leasing claimed Un-
ion Electric should be strictly liable and re-
sponsible for clean-up costs, because the sale
was allegedly abnormally dangerous accord-
ing to Illinois fort law.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's finding in favor of
Union Electric. The court emphasized that it
could only reverse a clearly erroneous deter-
mination of mixed fact and low.
The court noted that although the Ca-
hokia Power Plant, located in Illinois, cor
tained asbestos for heat insulation, it was not
decommissioned because of the substance.
Instead, the plant became uneconomical to
operate. Union Electric proceeded to sell the
plant to the highest bidder, who happened
to be a salvage contractor. G.J. Leasing
then purchased the plant from the contractor
on the some day as the original sale. An
expert who inspected the plant found asbes-
tos in th basmnt wher G.J. Leasing stored
grain. GJ. Leasing incurred $200,000 in
expenses in removing some of the asbestos.
G.J. Leasing argued that the sale of the
tract, which contained asbestos, constituted a
disposal or arrangement for disposal of a
hazardous substance. The court rejected this
argument, because Union Electric could not
have known whether selling the tract would
result in the release of a hazardous
substance.
The court also found that Union Electric
was not a responsible party under CERCIA,
because the salvage contractor caused the
release of the asbestos. In addition, the
court found that the clean-up costs were not
necessary and, therefore, Union Electric
would not be liable even if it had disposed
of or arranged for the disposal of the hazard-
ous substance. The expert who inspected the
plant merely recommended that the grain be
stored elsewhere and that the employees re-
ceive only limited exposure to the asbestos.
The court noted that the expert did not con-
sider the asbestos to be dangerous enough
to justify its removal. Thus, the court found
the expert's appraisal of costs GJ. leasing
incurred to be unnecessary.
The court also refused to hold Union Elec-
tric strictly liable under common law tort
claim for an abnormally dangerous activity.
G.J. Leasing attempted to show that the sale
of the property constituted an abnormally
dangerous activity, however, the court found
the tort claim barred by a five-year statute of
limitations.
-byfll A. Morris
Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp.,
53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995)
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's decision that the
S.C.S.C. Corporation (S.C.S.C.) was liable
under CERCIA and the Minnesota Environ-
mental Response and Liability Act (MERIA) for
33.3% of Control Data Corporation's (Con-
trol Data's) response costs resulting from
S.C.S.C.'s discharge of toxic chemicals into
the environment, but reversed the district
court's decision that S.C.S.C. was liable for
attomey fees as well.
S.C.S.C. appealed the district court's
decision claiming, 1) that it was not liable
for the response costs for investigating the
contamination, 2) that it was erroneous to
allocate 33.3% of the costs to it when it was
only responsible for 10% of the chemicals
released, and 3) that awarding attorney's
fees was improper. Control Data cross ap-
pealed, claiming that S.C.S.C. should be
responsible for 100% of the attorney's fees,
because the fees would not have been neces-
sary hod S.C.S.C. cooperated.
S.C.S.C. operated a drycleaning supply
business across the street from Control Data,
which operated a printed circuit-board facil-
ity. Control Data, while investigating a leak
in its sewer line, discovered groundwater
contamination under its property. As a result
of the investigation, it determined that con-
tamination consisted of two chemicals, 1,1,1
trichloroethane (TCA) and tetrachloroethylene
(PERC). Control Data immediately notified
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and
began working with the agency to clean up
the contamination. Upon further investigo-
lion, Control Data realized that it was only
responsible for the release of TCA and that
S.C.S.C. had been releasing PERC for the
post 14 years. Apparently, the PERC
"migrated" underneath Control Data's prop-
erly and mixed with its own contamination.
However, Control Data had already installed
a remediation system to remove both TCA
and PERC. Thus, it brought suit to recover
the portion of its costs attributable to the re-
lease of PERC.
The district court held S.C.S.C. liable for
33.3% of the costs, despite the fact that
PERC constituted only 10% of the contamina-
tion, because of the higher toxicity of PERC
and its difficulty to clean. S.C.S.C. argued
that this determination was erroneous be-
cause the degree of toxicity was not a
proper factor in determining percentages of
contribution.
In denying S.C.S.C's argument, the court
looked at two elements. First, it recognized
the "Gore factors" as guidance on the issue
of resolving contribution claims. One of
those factors is "the degree of toxicity of the
hazardous waste." Then, it looked to the
policy of CERCIA and determined that its pri-
mary goal is to "encourage timely cleanup of
hazardous waste sites" and "to place the
cost of that response on those responsible."
Thus, the court reasoned that increasing li-
ability based on toxicity served the policy
and goals of CERCIA, because it holds the
polluting party responsible for the costs attrib-
utable to the pollution and speeds up the re-
sponse time.
S.C.S.C. also argued that it was not re-
sponsible for the investigation costs, because
the sole reason for the investigation was
Control Data's releases. The court explained
that this argument would require it to interpret
CERCIA such that every response would
have to be attributed to a specific release.
This, the court said, would be too strict an
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interpretation. Once again, the court looked
to the policies of CERCIA to determine that
accepting S.C.S.C's argument would en-
courage people to overlook possible con-
tamination in the hopes that someone else
will discover it and initiate the investigation
themselves.
Finally, S.C.S.C. argued that it was in-
proper for the court to allocate attorney's fees
against it. The court reversed the portion of
attorney's fees awarded under CERCIA, cit-
ing Key Tronic, which held them unavailable
under CERCIA. The court, however, went on
to affirm the award of attorney fees under
MERLA. In doing so, it refuted S.C.S.C's
argument that Control Data was not a
"prevailing party" as required by MERIA.
Specifically, S.C.S.C. claimed that the
MERIA award was merely an alternative to
CERCIA and thus it did not actually prevail
under MERIA. The court explained that
while a plaintiff may not recover under two
different statutes for the same violation, it may
prevail under both statutes. The court stated
that because liability under both statutes de-
pended on a "common core of facts," Con-
trol Data prevailed under both.
Control Data cross appealed on the issue
of attorney's fees, claiming that S.C.S.C.
should be responsible for 100% of its attor-
ney's fees because none would have been
necessary had S.C.S.C. cooperated. This
determination was within the discretion of the
trial court, and the court found the lower
court's determination was not an abuse of
discretion.
Thus, the court affirmed all of the district
court's decision except the award of attor-
ney's fees and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
- byJoe Hewes
United States v. Cordova Chemical Com-
pany of Michigan, 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
1995)
Ott Chemical Company (Ott 1) pur-
chased land in Dalton Township, Michigan,
as a site for manufacturing chemicals. Dur-
ing Ott I's period of ownership from 1957
to 1965, the groundwater beneath the site
became contaminated. On Chemical Com-
pony (Ott 2), a subsidiary of CPC Interna-
tional, Inc., took over as owner of the site in
1965.
Pollution continued after this transfer of
ownership. The principle source of pollution
stemmed from the usage of unlined lagoons
for chemical waste disposal. During the
ownership of the Ot companies, however,
lagoon seepage was not the only cause of
contamination. Chemical spills from train
cars and drums, and overflows of chemicals
contained in equalization basins also contrib-
uted to the pollution level.
In 1972, Story Chemical Company took
over as the new owner of the site. Story
Chemical continued to operate the site until
1977 when it declared bankruptcy. After
Story Chemical's bankruptcy, the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)
visited the site to evaluate the extent of the
contamination. As a result of the severity of
contamination and a lack of resources with
which to cleanup the site, MDNR became
actively involved in searching for a purchaser
who could afford to help support the cost of
cleanup. This search led to Cordova Chemi-
cal Company (Cordova/California), a sub-
sidiary of Aerojet-General Corporation.
Cordova/Califomia and MDNR entered
into an agreement for the sale of the land.
MDNR agreed to rectify the sludge and
waste container problems on the site, while
Cordova/California agreed to give MDNR
$600,000 toward the agency's cleanup
costs, as well a eliminate the phosgene gas
problem. This agreement, however, did not
provide for a total cleanup of the site. In par-
ticular, the parties did not reach an agree-
ment with regard to the groundwater
contamination.
In 1978, Cordova Chemical Company
of Michigan (Cordova/Michigan), a subsidi-
ary of Cordova/California, acquired owner-
ship of the site. Cordova/Mchigan still
retained ownership of the site, but its chemi-
cal manufacturing operations ended in
1986.
The United States filed a cause of action
under § 107(a) of CERCIA to determine fi-
nancial responsibility for cleanup costs at the
manufacturing plant. The district court ruled
against the parent companies CPC and
Aerojet. The court held that both were liable
for the disposal of hazardous substances that
occurred while they or their subsidiaries
owned the site. CPC and Aerojet appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling, finding liability with respect to
CPC. The lower court had reasoned that
liability could only attach to CPC as a parent
corporation in two ways: CPC could be di-
rectly liable as an "operator" under § 107
(a) of CERCIA, or CPC could be liable by
way of common law veil-piercing.
The Sixth Circuit, however, concluded
that a parent corporation incurs operator li-
ability under CERCIA only when the require-
ments necessary to meet the common law
veil-piercing doctrine are met. The court
went on to state that in order to have corpo-
rate veil-piercing, there must be such a unity
of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and its owner
cease to exist. In addition, the circumstances
of the case must be such that adherence to
the notion of separate corporations would
only promote fraud or injustice. The court
reasoned that while the facts showed that
CPC took an active interest in the affairs of its
subsidiary, these facts alone could not sup-
port a finding of corporate veil-piercing.
The Sixth Circuit then turned to the issue
of MDNR's liability for cleanup costs. The
district court had rejected liability claims
brought against MDNR as an operator and
arranger. Only the district court's decision
regarding arranger liability was appealed.
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court
in determining that MDNR escaped liability.
It reasoned that the actions taken by MDNR
were in response to on environmental emer-
gency and that MDNR acted with good faith
when addressing the groundwater contomi-
nation problem at the site.
The final issue addressed on appeal was
the district court holding imposing liability on
Aerojet and Cordova/Michigan as present
owners of the site under § 107 (a) of CER-
CIA. Cordova/Michigan did not challenge
the decision of the district court on appeal.
The district court found Aerojet to be li-
able as both an owner and operator of the
contaminated site. In remanding, the Sixth
Circuit stated that the summary of activities at
the site during the period of ownership of the
Cordova Companies directly conflicted with
the district court's decision. In support of its
decision, the district court noted that addi-
tional releases of hazardous substances oc-
curred during the ownership of
Cordova/California. However, the Sixth
Circuit indicated that greater specificity was
needed as to the facts purported to support
this finding. The Sixth Circuit also stated, as
I ~ MELPRI
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it had with regard to the liability of CPC, that
Aerojet could not be held liable unless corpo-
rate veil-piercing could be found.
The Sixth Circuit directed the district court
to revisit its treatment of the defenses raised
by Aerojet, Cordova/California and
Cordova/Michigan under § 107(b)(3) of
CERCIA on remand. The district court con-
cluded that this section of CERCIA includes
contractual relationships created by deeds
transferring title. In rejecting the defense, the
district court stated that a title transfer of this
sort makes the defense unavailable to defen-
dants who have a direct or indirect contrac-
tual relationship with the parties responsible
for the site contamination. The Sixth Circuit
stated that the district court, in denying these
defenses, ignored the requirement that the
release of the hazardous substance must oc-
cur as a direct result of an act by a third
party made in connection with a contractual
obligation to the defendant.
- by Tricia Ann Baker
United States v. Union Electric Co., 64
F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 1995)
A group of non-settling potentially respon-
sible parties (PRPs) under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
liability Act (CERCLA) sought to intervene
against a consent degree between the EPA
and settling PRPs. The United States Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court decision denying the non-settling PRPs
motion to intervene. The court of appeals
held that intervention under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24 or CERCIA § 113(1) was
allowed, because non-settling PRPs have suffi-
cient interest in rights of contribution under
CERCIA § 113()(1) and (f)(2).
In the early 1980s, the EPA discovered
that on electrical equipment repair shop, Mis-
souri Electric Works Site (MEW), was con-
taminated with environmentally dangerous
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Under
CERCIA, the EPA identified 735 PRPs who
had sent equipment containing PCB contami-
noted oil to be repaired, scrapped, or resold
by MEW. A large group of these PRPs ne-
gotiated with the EPA regarding assignment
of clean-up costs. Non-settling PRPs argued
that the resulting allocation pion did not oc-
count for varying culpability of different PRPs.
In September 1991, the EPA sent a pro-
posed consent decree to all known PRPs with
notice that any PRP could join in the consent
decree if they did so within sixty days. In
June 1992, the EPA filed suit and the consent
decree against 179 settling PRPs pursuant to
CERCLA §§ 106 and 107, 42 U.S.C. §§
9606 and 9607. The parties based the
consent decree on the negotiated allocation
plan, which was a point of contention for
non-settling PRPs, and also offered protection
from claims based on CERCIA § 11 3(f)(2).
In November 1992, non-settling PRPs
moved to intervene as a claim of right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and §
113(0) of CERCIA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(l).
The non-settling PRPs argued that settling PRPs
should still be liable for potential contribution
claims. Non-setling PRPs also argued that
they should be allowed an opportunity to de-
fend against unfair allocations of liability
from the MEW site.
This issue, whether non-settling PRPs had
sufficient, legally protectable interest in contri-
bution claims based on CERCIA § 113(M)1)
to intervene in a suit between settling PRPs
and the EPA when the settling PRPs were
sheltered from contribution claims of non-
settling PRPs pursuant to CERCIA § 11 3(f)(2),
was one of first impression before the court.
The court noted that the requirements for
intervention under Rule 24 and § 113(l) of
CERCIA were almost identical, except that
under CERCIA, the government must show
that the potential intervenor's interest is ade-
quately represented by parties already in the
lawsuit, and under Rule 24, the intervenor
must show that the current representation is
inadequate. The court noted that the trial
court had not applied the proper standards
to the claim of intervention as of right, be-
cause it had improperly considered CER-
CIA's policy of encouraging speedy
settlement rather than the rule itself. The court
conducted a de novo review of the motion
for intervention.
The court ruled that the non-senling PRPs had
a substantial, direct, and legally protectable
interest. The court expressly sided with a ju-
dicial minority position on this issue. The ma-
jority of courts had decided that the policy
and legislative intent of CERCIA was to en-
courage PRPs to settle, and that allowing in-
tervention would not encourage settlement,
because there would be no incentive for PRPs
to protect their contribution interest. How-
ever, the court here decided that policy and
legislative history were improper elements to
consider in deciding whether to allow inter-
vention. The court found that the terminology
of CERCIA § 113(0) clearly and unambigu-
ously gave intervention rights to "any
person."
In so ruling, the court denied the EPA and
settling PRPs' argument that allowing §
113(0) contribution claims would conflict with
the intent of CERCIA § 11 3(f)(2). EPA and
settling PRPs had argued for the majority posi-
lion, that Congress designed § 113(f)(2) to
encourage prompt settlement and that allow-
ing intervention to protect contribution interest
would conflict with legislative intent, and so
must not be allowed. The court ruled that
there was no inherent conflict. In fact, since
§ 1 13(f)(2) cuts off contribution rights from
non-settling PRPs, CERCIA itself creates suffi-
cient interest to warrant intervention by non-
settling PRPs.
The potential liability of non-settling PRPs
was not "too contingent," nor speculative
with respect to the issues of further litigation,
and the outcome of that litigation. The court
held that under § 113(f)(2), a contribution
interest arises immediately after litigation, pur-
suant to CERCIA §§ 106 or 107, has be-
gun. Thus, only the recovery of the
contribution claim is contingent on further lifti-
gation. The court ruled that there was no
"daisy chain" of events necessary to create
liability for the non-settling PRPs.
The court denied the EPA and settling
PRPs' argument that non-settling PRPs' inter-
ests had been adequately protected in the
procedures leading up to the litigation. The
court based this finding on the fact that there
was no party whose interests were
"identical" to the non-settling PRPs'. The EPA
was at odds with the non-settling PRPs, and
therefore could not be said to be represent-
ing non-settling PRPs as a sovereign
representative.
The court also decided other factors of
intervention in the non-settling PRPs' favor.
The motion to intervene had been timely and
the interests of the intervenors would, as a
practical matter, have been impaired, be-
cause the present litigation may have resulted
in a bar or reduction of the contribution
claims by the non-settling PRPs. In addition,
non-settling PRPs had an interest in challeng-
ing the "faimess" of the Consent Decree.
- by Kevin Murphy
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RCRA
Systech Environmental Corp. v. United
States, 55 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1995)
After applying for a Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit to incin-
erate hazardous waste, Systech
Environmental Corporation (Systech) filed for
review of the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA's) denial. The EPA's determi-
nation hinged on the fact that Systech did not
meet the RCRA permit requirement which
states that in addition to lessees, landowners
must also verify that the application was
"processed under [their] direction and
supervision."
In this case, Systech was unable to se-
cure the necessary certification from its lessor,
the Tejon Ranchcorp (Tejon). Tejon leased a
segment of a ranch to the General Portland
Cement Company, which in turn subleased a
part of the ranch to Systech. Systech col-
lected, processed and incinerated Portland's
wastes, a service it continued to provide after
Portland sold its interests to the National Ce-
ment Company of California, Incorporated
(National). A change in EPA regulations
made these activities allowable by permit
only in 1991.
EPA notified National that the permit ap-
plication was deficient, based on the require-
rnents of 40 C.F.R §270.10, and later
issued a statement indicating that it intended
to deny the request. Although National was
later able to secure the signature of Tejon's
representatives, the EPA determined that Na-
tional did not meet the permit requirements.
After National exhausted its administrative
appeals, the EPA issued a final determination
denying the permit.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed EPA's final decision for abuse of dis-
cretion. The court agreed that Tejon
qualified as the landowner under the statute,
and a plain reading of the relevant sections
indicated that landowners such as Tejon must
either submit their own applications, or co-
sign the application prepared by the lessees
who are conducting the regulated activity.
However, the court did find EPA's de-
mands unreasonable in light of the certifico-
tion landowners must also submit, which in
many cases might require them to make false
statements. The certification, in effect, re-
quired Tejon to state not only that it had
knowledge of the activity, but that it directed
and supervised the application process. The
court found that even the admittedly impor-
tant policy goals behind the statute did not
justify the enormity of the burden it placed on
absentee owners.
Instead, the court found it reasonable to
only require owners to indicate they are
aware of the activity taking place on their
property, and that they are potentially liable
for any environmental violations. Thus, the
EPA's goal of impressing upon landowners
the significance of their part in hazardous
waste joint-ventures is achieved, without the
additional requirements that landowners
might not be able to meet.
Vacating the EPA's denial, the court re-
manded the application for further agency
consideration. However, the court left little
room for EPA to maneuver. The court stated
that Tejon's "alternate" certification met statu-
tory requirements because it sufficiently
showed knowledge of the occurrence and
extent of the hazardous waste activity.
- by Sarah Madden
Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir.
1995)
J. Richard and Margaret L Furrer brought
this action under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6987 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), for
the recovery of cleanup costs associated with
soil contamination caused by leaking under-
ground gasoline storage tanks. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order granting the Brown's
motions to dismiss.
In 1991, the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources had ordered the Furrers to
remediate their property's petroleum contami-
nation. After doing so, the Furrers sought
recovery from Donald F. and Dorothy J.
Brown, Louis W. and Geraldine J. Fagas,
and Shell Oil Company. The Browns and
Fagases had been owners of the property
prior to the Furrers, and Shell Oil Company
had been a lessee of the properly, operating
a service station on the premises. In their
complaint, the Furrers alleged one count un-
der RCRA and three state common law theo-
ries of recovery. . The district court, holding
that it did not have subject maler jurisdiction
over the federal claim, and declining to exer-
cise supplemental jurisdiction over the re-
maining state claims, granted the Brown's
motions to dismiss.
For federal court jurisdiction purposes, the
Furrers had relied upon RCRA's citizen suit
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)
(1988). This provision does not give district
courts express authority to award money
judgments for costs incurred in remediating
contaminated sites. In its analysis, the Eighth
Circuit determined that if such a remedy were
to be available under § 6972, Congress
must have implicitly created the remedy by
authorizing the district court "to order . . .
such other action as may be necessary," or
that the "cause of action . . . may have be-
come a port of the federal common law
through the exercise of judicial power to
fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful
conduct."
The court first noted that federal common
law was not of issue in this case, leaving the
statute and any implied Congressional inten-
tion as the sole sources of recovery for the
Furrers. In determining whether congres-
sional intent was to authorize a monetary
remedy for private citizens, the court relied
upon a four-factor test set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975). In applying the test, the court cited
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
179 (1988), and noted that the Cort analy-
sis "no longer involves a balancing of the
four factors; they now serve only as 'guides
to discerning congressional intent."' In its
four-part analysis, the court first referred to the
statute to determine if the Furrers were in the
class for whose benefit the statute was en-
acted, and secondly, to the legislative history
to see if it explicitly or implicitly demonstrated
an intent to create or deny the cause of ac-
tion. Then, citing California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981), the court
noted that the last two Cort factors "are only
of relevance if the first two factors give indi-
cation of congressional intent to create the
remedy." Despite a negative finding under
the first two factors, the court continued its
analysis "out of an abundance of caution."
Third, the court examined the proposed rem-
edy in the context of the purpose of the statu-
tory scheme, and fourth, considered whether
the cause of action is one traditionally a mat-
ter state low, so that inferring a federal rem-
edy would be inappropriate. As a result of its
analysis under this test, the court determined
that none of the factors were sufficient to irn-
ply into § 6972 a cause of action for the
reimbursement of cleanup costs.
MDELPR
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Next, the court discussed a decision from
the Ninth Circuit, KFC Western, Inc. v.
Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995),
which provided district courts subject matter
jurisdiction over private actions for the recov-
ery of cleanup costs and extended a mone-
tary remedy to § 6972 citizen suits.
Although the Ninth Circuit had relied upon
two Eighth Circuit decisions in its analysis,
those decisions did not reflect consideration
of the subject matter jurisdiction issue nor did
they raise the issue of cleanup cost recovery
in a case such as the one before the court.
As a result, the court explicitly disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit and decided not to ex-
tend to the Furrers a remedy under § 6972
for their recovery of cleanup costs. Unable
to find that Congress intended such a remedy
to be available, the court refused to modify
the existing statutory scheme. Meanwhile,
the court stated that it was not unsympathetic
to the Furrers' case and specifically noted
that it did not intend its present decision to
interfere with their state court remedies.
- by Bryan D. Watson
CLEAN AIR ACT
American Petroleum Institute v. United
States, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
In a recent ruling, the D.C. Circuit Court
held that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) cannot require renewable ad-
ditives in reformulated gasoline. It found the
Clean Air Act (CAA) only authorized the EPA
to take actions necessary to improve air qual-
ity and not to achieve wider environmental
goals such as conservation of fossil fuels.
Congress authorized the EPA to establish
requirements for reformulated gasoline (RFG)
to be used in nonatainment areas. In order
to reformulate gasoline so that it will be less
polluting, oxygenates must be added. The
primary RFG additives in use today are
methyl tertiary buyl ether (MTBE) and etha-
no. Ethanol is made from corn, a renew-
able resource; however, reformulated
gasoline made with ethanol results in higher
volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions.
MTBE is made from nonrenewable sources
such as natural gas and petroleum, but MTBE
does not increase VOC emissions. A third
additive, ethyl tertiary butyl ether (ETBE), is
both renewable and does not increase VOC
emissions. However, ETBE, which is derived
from ethanol and presumably more
expensive, is not currently in widespread use.
In August 1994, the EPA issued a final
renewable oxygenate rule (ROR) for reformu-
lated gasolines. This rule limited VOC emis-
sions and at the some time, required that
thirty percent of the oxygen in RFG come
from renewable sources. The EPA noted that
this rule would effectively require the use of
ETBE.
The American Petroleum Institute chal-
lenged the rule and argued that EPA lacked
statutory authority to mandate use of renew-
able oxygenates. The Institute said that §
7545(k) gave the EPA control over air quality
concerns but not authority to pursue broader
environmental goals. It further suggested,
and EPA conceded, that the ROR could actu-
ally make air quality worse by increasing use
of ethanol over MTBE.
EPA countered that the ROR would help
conserve fossil energy and reduce global
warming. Although these goals are not di-
rectly related to air quality, they were within
the Agency's interpretation of the statutory
framework. The EPA declared that the rule
would reasonably "optimize the resulting im-
pacts on cost, energy requirements, and
other health and environmental impacts."
EPA asserted that its interpretation should be
entitled to deference based on prior case
law. Accordingly, the Agency's interpreta-
tion should be upheld unless it was manifestly
contrary to the CAA. EPA pointed out that
when Congress wanted to limit EPA's author-
ity, it did so expressly.
The court held that § 7545(k)(1) unambi-
guously precluded the adoption of RFG rules
that were not directed toward the reduction
of VOC and toxic emissions. The court
stated that the sole purpose of the RFG pro-
gram is to reduce air pollution. Therefore,
the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act
to authorize the ROR was improper. The
court flatly rejected EPA's contention that a
delegation of power can be presumed if it is
not expressly withheld.
The court interpreted the § 7547(k)(1)
consideration of non-air quality factors as
subordinate to the overriding goal of air
quality. The court effectively treated the state-
ments as caveats, which only served to en-
sure that emission reduction regulations do
not have inordinate economic, environ-
mental, or energy conservation effects.
Therefore, the court held that EPA lacks
authority to advance the use of renewable
oxygenates when this effort is not in further-
ance of, and may be at the expense of, re-
ductions in toxic emissions.
- by Kin Semsch
National Mining Association v. United
States, 59 F.3d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals denied the petition by National Min-
ing Association, American Forest and Paper
Association, and General Electric for review
of § 112 of the 1990 Clean Air Act. The
petition challenged the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (EPA's) definition of "major
source" and its inclusion of fugitive emissions
in a source's aggregate emissions for "major
source" classification purposes. The court
granted review, however, of the claim raised
by Chemical Manufacturers Association and
American Petroleum Institute that the EPA
should not deny consideration of the effect of
slate and local controls on emissions solely
because they are not federally enforceable.
EPA defined a "major source" as a sta-
tionary source or contiguous group of
sources under common control that emits ten
tons per year of one pollutant or twentyfive
tons per year of a combination of pollutants.
For purposes of the major source definition,
the guidelines did not exempt equipment
from source categories or create industrial
classifications for major source designations.
The court found that this rule was reasonable
and need not be set aside.
The second argument by National
Mining was that the EPA did not conduct
special rulemaking pursuant to § 302(j), 42
U.S.C. § 7602(i), before counting fugitive
emissions when accounting the aggregate
emissions from a source. The court distin-
guished § 302(j) from § I 12(a)(1), the statu-
tory section at issue here, and found that
fugitive emissions were emissions from sta-
tionary sources for the purposes of §
11 2(a)(1).
The EPA did not persuade the court, how-
ever, on the issue of accepting only federally
enforceable controls on emissions. The EPA
argued that Congress left this issue up to the
agency when it failed to mention the prob-
lem in § 112. Further, the EPA stated, there
were ways for states to hove their restraints
considered federally enforceable and so, the
EPA has not limited the controls on emissions
to those initiated by the federal government.
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The court found that while the question
was not specifically addressed by the legisla-
ture, § 112 did not confer upon the EPA the
option to reject controls on bases other than
their effectiveness. It also decided that the
procedures required by the EPA for state con-
trols to be granted federally enforceable
status bore little or no relation to the effective-
ness of the controls. Finally, it held that the
interest the EPA had in lessening the adminis-
trative burden involved in reviewing the state
control provisions was not sufficient to im-
pose the limitations it had imposed.
- by Rebecca Tenbrook
CLEAN WATER ACT
Northwest Environmental Advocates v.
Portland, 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995)
In 1991, an environmental action group,
the Northwest Environmental Advocates
(NWEA), initiated a suit against the city of
Portland and alleged its municipal sewage
treatment procedures were not in compliance
with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
standards. More specifically, NWEA ad-
vanced two arguments: 1) Portland's sew-
age releases into local rivers violated a
1984 National Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) permit by exceeding the
number of places it designated for sewage
release; and 2) the releases also violated the
Clean Water Act (CWA), which categorized
all unpermitted pollution as illegal, regardless
of the circumstances.
NWEA sought civil damages, as well as
an injunction to prevent the city from allow-
ing these "combined sewer overflows"
(CSOs), which occurred during periods of
precipitation and created sewage that ex-
ceeded the city's treatment capacity. The
district court found for the city and deter-
mined not only did the permit cover the con-
tested CSO points, but that NWEA did not
have standing to bring a citizen suit under
the CWA. The court did not consider the
merits of NWEA's allegations that Portland
was also violating the CWA itself.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed, and NWEA filed a petition for re-
hearing. While the petition was pending, a
United States Supreme Court case estab-
lished that citizens do have standing under
the CWA to challenge quality standard
violations.
In accepting the petition for rehearing,
the court of appeals vacated its previous
opinion, in consideration of its conflict with
the Supreme Court concerning standing. It
found that NWEA did have a cause of ac-
tion under the CWA, based on a plain read-
ing of the statute, legislative history, and
recent case law.
However, the court's new holding re-
established its previous finding that the city
did not violate the permit's requirement. The
court first determined the standard of review
for the interpretation of the permit to be de
novo, since this is the appropriate standard
for all legal writings, regardless of their ambi-
guity. It rejected NWEA's argument that the
permit only anticipated two "outfalls," or
points of release, rather than the more than
fifty points where CSOs took place. Instead,
the court found that although the permit did
not detail the additional outfalls, the lan-
guage of the permit was broad enough to
cover other "permitted activities," including
these CSOs. It based this interpretation on
the plain meaning of the permit and extrinsic
evidence from various sources.
However, the court of appeals remanded
the case on a final issue. Because the district
court did not consider one of NWEA's alter-
native theories in the original cause of ac-
tion, that Portland was in fact violating the
CWA by allowing any unpermitted pollutants
to enter the rivers, the case still contained a
genuine controversy.
- by Sarah Madden
NEPA
Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 53
F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995)
This case was the latest in a string of five
cases that challenged the construction of the
Mount Graham international observatory.
The main issue in these cases dealt with the
protection of the highly endangered red
squirrel population living on the various
mountains on which the University of Arizona
(University) wished to construct its observa-
tory. The plans for this observatory called for
the construction of several telescopes on dif-
ferent peaks within the Mount Graham, Ari-
zona, area. Because the construction of
such telescopes could potentially harm or de-
stroy the habitat of the red squirrel, the or-
ganizations charged with approving such
projects, the United States Forest Service (FS)
and the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS), must comply with the require-
ments set forth in § 7 of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (ESA), and §
102 of theNational Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (NEPA), before
granting approval for the construction. In this
case, the Mount Graham Coalition (Coali-
tion), an alliance composed of environmental
groups and individuals who wanted to pro-
tect the red squirrel, contended that the FS
and FWS did not comply with these regula-
tions before granting approval to the Univer-
sity to construct a large binocular telescope
on Peak 10,477 in Mount Graham.
Originally, the University had proposed
that it build the telescopes necessary for its
project on three different peaks within Mount
Graham, including one telescope on Peak
10,477. However, the FS and the FWS
had issued a biological opinion that this type
of construction would likely create grave dan-
ger to the red squirrels and that the red squir-
rel population was "extremely vulnerable to
extinction." After making this report, the
FWS presented the University with three
"reasonable and prudent alternatives." Es-
sentially, these alternatives, called RPAs, pre-
sented the University with three options: 1)
The project could be terminated altogether;
2) construction of the telescopes could be
allowed, but only on one specific peak,
High Peak; 3) three telescopes, support facili-
ties, and an access road could be con-
structed on another peak, Emerald Peak, but
only if the University met very specific condi-
tions in regard to this construction. Soon af-
ter the FS and FWS issued these RPAs, and
before the University was able to select one
of these alternatives, the U.S. Congress
passed the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act
(AICA), Pub. L No. 100-696, §§
601-607, 102 Stat. 4597, 4597-99
(1988). Basically, this act gave the Univer-
sity a green light to "immediately" proceed
with the construction of the three telescopes,
support facilities, and access road if it com-
plied with the terms and conditions as set
forth in RPA 3. If the University met these
terms, AICA provided for a "Special Use"
authorization for this construction, which ex-
empted the University from complying with
NEPA and ESA. In 1989, the University re-
ceived a Special Use Permit and Manage-
ment Plan. The permit incorporated RPA 3
by reference, including a site map that indi-




The main difficulties occurred in March
1993, after the University had already built
two of the three telescopes called for in RPA
3. The University then requested permission
to build the third telescope in one of four lo-
cations that were different than the location
approved by the Special Use Permit. Ini-
tially, the FWS indicated that the University
would need to comply with § 7 of the ESA.
However, the FS completed a biological as-
sessment which indicated that there would be
less harm to the squirrels by allowing the Uni-
versity to construct its telescope on Peak
10,477 than on the other locations that the
University had presented. Therefore, on De-
cember 5, 1993, the FS, without first con-
forming to the guidelines required by the ESA
and NEPA, gave the University permission to
build its telescope on Peak 10,477. Soon
after it granted this permission, the coalition
filed suit against FS and FWS for violating
the ESA and NEPA. The district court
granted the Coalition's motion for summary
judgement and found that the FS and FWS
had violated the ESA and NEPA. The court
permanently enjoined the FS and the FWS
from allowing construction of the telescope to
take place on Peak 10,477, unless the con-
struction plan was in compliance with the
ESA and NEPA. FS, FWS, and the Univer-
sity appealed this ruling.
The primary argument the defendants put
forth was that Congress' enactment of AICA
exempted them from complying with NEPA
and ESA regulations for the telescope pro-
ject. Congressional exemption is the only
way to avoid compliance with these regula-
tions. The key point of contention was in in-
terpreting what Congress had intended to be
allowed when it enacted the AICA. Defen-
donts argued that the AICA stated that its pro-
visions are to be "subject to the terms and
conditions of Reasonable and Prudent Alter-
native Three." Defendants then argued that
there are only two parts of RPA 3 which are
expressly labeled as terms and conditions.
These conditions required that the University
report all instances in which a red squirrel is
killed or wounded and that it monitor the
squirrel population in order to see how it re-
acts to the construction. Accordingly, defen-
donts contended that AICA should allow the
University to construct the telescopes any-
where it pleased, so long as it complied with
these two "terms and conditions."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sum-
marily rejected this interpretation of AlCA's
intent. In previous decisions regarding
AICA, the court ruled that the AICA incorpo-
rate all of the provisions of RPA 3, including
the locations where the telescopes should be
built. The court found that there was no indi-
cation that Congress meant to allow the Uni-
versity to build the telescope at any other
location without first conforming with NEPA
and ESA. The court pointed to three different
occurrences to further show that Congress
did not intend for there to be analtemative
site.
First, it indicated that where the AICA did
alter RPA 3 in order to further its intent, it did
not change or make any allowances for
there to be a different location for any of the
proposed telescopes. The court reasoned
that because in certain places Congress did
alter provisions of RPA 3, it would have al-
tered any other provisions that did not further
its intent. Arguably then, if Congress had
wanted to change RPA 3 to allow the Univer-
sity to select an alternative site, it would have
done so.
Second, AICA exempted from NEPA and
ESA a specific access road that would need
to be built on Emerald Peak. The construc-
tion of the telescope on Peak 10,477 would
require that a new access road be built on
this peak which would have a different type
of shape than the one contemplated for Emer-
aid Peak. Because AICA specifically ex-
empted only one access road, the court held
that it probably did not intend to exempt ad-
ditional roads. Again, if Congress had in-
tended for.there to be an exemption for other
roads, it would have stated so in the Act.
Third, AICA specifically stated that con-
struction of the telescopes, as contemplated
in RPA 3, should proceed as soon as possi-
ble. Therefore, the court reasoned, Congress
would not have intended for there to be de-
lays that would inevitably arise by the selec
tion of another construction site. The court
indicated it believed that Congress approved
these specific sites for construction, because it
knew that by doing so, there would be much
less delay in the construction of the project.
For these reasons, the court affirmed the
district court's ruling that AICA did not vest
the FS with the authority to give the University
permission to construct on a site different than
that contemplated by RPA 3. In order for fur-
ther construction on this site to be allowed,
compliance with both the ESA and NEPA
must be confirmed.
- by Byron Woehlecke
Duncan Energy Company v. United States
Forest Service, 50 F.3d 584 (8th Cir.
1995)
The U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service)
appealed the grant of a declaratory judg-
ment against it that denied it the power to
regulate, the access to, and use of, an area
located within the Custard National Forest
that held privately owned mineral rights. The
judgment allowed Duncan Energy Co. (Dun-
can), the mineral rights holder, to continue
mineral exploration on the property without
first getting approval of its "surface use
plan." The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed the declaratory
judgment and remanded the case back to
the United States District Court for the District
of North Dakota.
The dispute arose due to conflicts be-
tween Duncan and the Forest Service as to
whether Duncan could begin construction of
an access road to reach its mineral rights in
order to begin drilling for oil and gas. The
Forest Service insisted on doing environ-
mental impact investigations according to the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
before construction began, which might have
taken longer than 2 years. Duncan con-
tended that along with the Forest Service, it
was party to a Memorandum of Understand-
ing (the Understanding), which provided that
the Forest Service would process any of its
surface use plans within ten working days of
receipt. Duncan believed it had this right,
because its predecessors to the mineral rights
negotiated and entered into the Understand-
ing. However, the Forest Service disagreed
and chose to follow the policies of NEPA.
Upon written request, the Forest Service
agreed to comply with the Understanding as
long as Duncan completed necessary envi-
ronmental surveys on certain amendments to
its original survey plan. However, the Forest
Service later failed to comply as agreed, and
Duncan began construction and erected its
drill without approval. Ultimately, the Forest
Service terminated the Understanding and
both parties filed suit. Duncan requested a
declaratory judgment prohibiting the Forest
Service from impeding access to its mineral
rights or regulating its explorations. The
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Forest Service requested a permanent injunc-
tion against Duncan prohibiting it from further
activity on the property or any other National
Forest land.
The district court held in favor of Duncan,
because it said the mineral right estate was
superior to the Forest Service's surface estate.
Thus, according to the court, Duncan could
completely destroy the value of the surface
area in exploring its mineral rights.
The Forest Service appealed, claiming
that under federal law, 36 C.F.R. §
251.50(a), and under North Dakota law, it
had the authority to regulate surface access
to mineral rights through the "special use"
regulations. However, Duncan argued that
because reserved mineral rights are ad-
dressed separately in 36 C.F.R. § 251.15,
the special use regulation provision did not
apply. Initially, the Forest Service disagreed
with Duncan's use of its property because it
failed to get approval from the Service pursu-
ant to 36 C.F.R. § 251.50.
The court of appeals addressed North
Dakota law first and held that the mineral es-
tate was dominant over the surface estate but
that the Forest Service, as holder of the sur-
face estate, had the right to require that only
reasonable use be made of the surface area.
However, the court explained that there was
no provision in North Dakota law that al-
lowed the surface estate holder to enjoin the
mineral rights holder from unreasonable uses.
Instead the law only said that the surface es-
tate holder has the right to receive twenty
days written notice of the operations and re-
ceive damages as a remedy.
However, the court did find that Con-
gress had the power to regulate federal land
under the property clause, found in Article IV,
Sec. 3, cl. 2. The court explained that Con-
gress had given the Forest Service broad
powers under the "special use" regulations,
which required that all special uses of the
National Forest System must be approved by
an officer of the Forest Service.
The court summarized its holding by ex-
plaining that the Forest Service's deviation
from the Understanding was not a violation
of the Custard National Forest Management
Plan and that it had a right to determine the
reasonable use of a federal surface area.
The court explained that even if North Da-
kota law was interpreted to be more lenient
by allowing unrestricted access to federal
land after twenty days notice, it was
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inconsistent with federal law and could there-
fore be pre-empted. Additionally, the court
explained that protecting federal lands was a
congressionally mandated program that
would be frustrated under North Dakota law
and thus, the choice of law rules required it
to chose the federal law.
Ultimately, the court remanded the re-
quest for an injunction back to the district





Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities For a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct.
2407(1995)
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
For a Great Oregon (Sweet Home) brought
a declaratory judgment against the Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt (Secretary) and
the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service
to challenge the Secretary's definition of
"harm" as applied to the Endangered Spe-
cies Act.
Sweet Home was comprised of landown-
ers, logging companies and families depend-
ent on the forest products industry in the
Pacific Northwest and Southeast. The group
had been adversely affected by prohibitions
against logging on lands inhabited by the
red-cockaded woodpecker and the spotted
owl. The precursor to the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (Act) named the red-cockaded wood-
pecker as an endangered species in 1970.
The Secretary, through separate regulations,
also extended the Act prohibitions to protect
the spotted owl, as it is a threatened spe-
cies, or species likely to become endangered
within the foreseeable future.
In an action brought in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia,
Sweet Home challenged the statutory validity
of the Secretary's definition of the word
"harm," which included habitat degradation
and modification that indirectly affected the
woodpecker and owl. Sweet Home alleged
in its complaint that by expanding the defini-
lion of "harm" to include indirect acts as well
as the direct application of force against an
animal, the Secretary had caused Sweet
Home members to suffer economic hardship.
The Interior Department regulations that
implemented the taking provision of the Act
defined "harm" as an act which actually kills
or injures wildlife. The regulations - in effect
since 1975, but amended in 1981 to re-
quire an actual death or injury of a protected
animal for a violation to occur - stated that
such an act "may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impair-
ing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding, or sheltering."
Sweet Home's main argument was that
Congress did not intend the word "take," as
used in § 9 of the Act, to include habitat
modification and other indirect harm to spe-
cies; therefore, the Interior Department had
wrongfully expanded the scope of the Act's
taking provision. Sweet Home focused on
three points in support of its argument: 1) the
Senate had deleted language from the origi-
nal version of the Act which had defined
"taking" to include indirect harm such as
habitat modification; 2) Congress intended
for § 5 of the Act, the section that enabled
the federal government to buy private lands,
to be the exclusive method to prevent habitat
modification; and 3) since the Senate had
included the term "harm" within the Act's
definition of "take" in a floor amendment to
the Act, the courts could not approve of a
more expansive definition of harm promul-
gated by the Secretary than that which al-
ready existed in the Act's taking provision.
In holding that the Secretary's interpreta-
tion of harm was reasonable, the district
court entered summary judgment for petition-
ers, rejecting each of Sweet Home's three
arguments. A divided court of appeals first
affirmed the judgment. However, in 1994,
the panel reversed the decision upon rehear-
ing, stating that although the word harm is
subject to numerous definitions, the immedi-
ate statutory context in which "harm" ap-
peared counseled against a broad
interpretation. The court of appeals stated
that the taking provision was intended to ap-
ply only to direct acts such as "A hit B."
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari because the court's decision conflicted
with a 1988 decision of the Ninth Circuit.
The Court reversed, stating that the legislative
history of the Act, while not specifically dis-
cussing the term "harm," made it clear that
Congress intended the taking provision "to
cover indirect as well as purposeful actions."
The Court further held that the Act gave the
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Secretary wide latitude in enforcing the stat-
ute and that, combined with the regulatory
expertise the Secretary possesses which is
necessary for enforcement, courts should not
interfere with the Secretary's reasonable inter-
pretation of harm.
The Court stated that the Act supported
the Secretary's broader interpretation of the
word "harm" in three ways. First, § 3(19) of
the Act defined the term "take" by using the
direct action verbs. If the Interior Department
were to exclude habitat changes from the
definition of "harm," the Court reasoned, it in
effect would be duplicating the meaning of
the term "take." The Court thus refused to
approve of a limited definition of "harm" that
would be repetitive of other terms in the Act.
Second, the Court reasoned that the
Act's comprehensive protection of endan-
gered and threatened species supported the
Secretary's interpretation of harm as includ-
ing both direct and indirect damage to the
red cockaded woodpecker and spotted owl.
The Court emphasized that the Act's prede-
cessors did not contain the sweeping lan-
guage of its provisions and did not apply to
all lands in the United States and its territorial
seas. The Court recognized Sweet Home's
argument that certain unforeseeable or mini-
mal harm should not result in violations of the
Act. However, Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, refused to lend credence to Sweet
Home's facial attack on the Secretary's inter-
pretation of "harm," stating that to do so
would enable even the most egregious viola-
tors of the Act to wipe out entire habitats by
arguing their actions only indirectly caused
the harm.
Third, the Court stated that Congress ob-
viously intended that § 9 prohibit both indi-
rect and forceful takings because it had
authorized the Secretary to issue permits for
takings otherwise prohibited under §
9(a)( 1)(B), as long as those takings were inci-
dental to the carrying out of lawful activity.
To obtain a permit, applicants must prepare
a conservation plan that specifies how they
plan to minimize the impact of the proposed
land use on endangered and threatened spe-
cies. The Court offered this as evidence that
Congress intended to include in the Act's
prohibitions against takings both foreseeable
and accidental effects on species.
The Court further rejected Sweet Home's
argument that the Secretary's interpretation of
harm pursuant to § 9 was inconsistent with
the § 5 provision for private land purchases
and the § 7 provision that directed federal
agencies to avoid destruction or modification
of habitats. Unlike the other two provisions,
the Court reasoned, § 9 cannot be enforced
until an actual killing or injury of an endan-
gered species has occurred. Therefore, the
Secretary's prohibition in § 9 against indirect
harm, such as the destruction of forests, was
not duplicitous of other provisions in the Act.
- by Douglas T. Cohen
CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIMS
Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corporation, 50
F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995)
This appeal sprang from an action filed
by residents of Silver Creek against FAG
Bearings Corporation (FAG). The gist of this
appeal, however, was between FAG and
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR). FAG moved, in district court, to
involuntarily join MDNR under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 19(a), based on MDNR's
statements that it intended to sue FAG for the
costs of remediation. Since the citizens of
Silver Creek sought remediation costs in the
their citizen suit, FAG argued that joinder
was necessary to prevent multiple or inconsis-
tent obligations. MDNR resisted joinder on
the theory that it was subject to Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a state agency. The
district court granted FAG's motion to join
MDNR. This appeal followed.
The basis of MDNR's Eleventh Amend-
ment argument was that involuntary joinder,
even if it involves later realignment, consti-
tutes a suit against the state. The Eleventh
Amendment states that: "The Judicial Power
of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Since the interpretation of this
amendment, based on its plain language,
has been so varied throughout the years, the
court of appeals rejected a plain words inter-
pretation of the Eleventh Amendment. Addi-
tionally, the court was unwilling to examine
the few cases involving state joinder. The
court noted that these cases were irrelevant
since they did not discuss the Eleventh
Amendment issue.
The court opted to review the Eleventh
Amendment based upon its function within
our governmental system. More precisely,
the court attempted to define exactly what
constituted a suit against the state. The court
cited Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1963), for its
proposition that a suit is against the state if
"the judgment sought would expend itself on
the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration or if the effect
of the judgment would be to restrain the Gov-
ernment from acting, or to compel it to act."
By forcing MDNR to prosecute at a time
and place determined by the federal courts,
the state may lose potential recovery costs
and may be barred from future claims
against FAG. The court noted that "this dis-
respect for state autonomy in decision-making
is precisely what the Eleventh Amendment
was intended to avoid." Therefore, the court
of appeals reversed and remanded, conclud-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the involuntary joinder of MDNR.
- by Greg Moldafsky
National Solid Wastes Management Asso-
ciation v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir.
1995)
This dispute arose over a Wisconsin stat-
ute enacted to curb the increase in solid
waste disposal in Wisconsin landfills. The
statute required generators who dispose of
solid waste in a Wisconsin landfill to comply
with several requirements to keep recyclable
materials from disposal. The requirements
not only applied to Wisconsin generators,
but they also required out-of-state communities
to comply with the statute if any generator
within that community wished to dispose of
solid waste in Wisconsin. A solid waste
management trade association, landfill own-
ers, and landfill operators claimed the Wis-
consin statute violated the United States
Constitution in that it was a direct violation of
the Commerce Clause.
The United States Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals applied several tests in reviewing
the statute. First, after determining that solid
waste disposal is commerce for purposes of
review under the Commerce Clause, the
court said the statute must not directly regu-
late interstate commerce. The Wisconsin stat-
ute required all out-of-state communities to
adhere to the statute if any generator within
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that community disposed of solid waste in
Wisconsin. The court found this to be a di-
rect attempt to regulate interstate commerce
and, therefore, a violation of the Commerce
Clause. Second, the court found the statute
violated the Commerce Clause because it
discriminated against interstate commerce.
The court, using a higher standard for dis-
crimination, required the state to prove that
no nondiscriminatory alternatives existed.
Since the goal of the Wisconsin statute, the
removal of all recyclable materials from solid
waste before disposal, could be accom-
plished by requiring all solid waste to be sent
to a materials recovery facility before dis-
posal, the court found that the statute failed
this test.
The last test the court used, weighed the
burdens on outof-state commerce with the
benefits to local interests. The court reasoned
that regulating waste that was not brought
into Wisconsin had no benefit to local inter-
ests. The court found this to be a substantial
burden on outof-state generators and a bur-
den on interstate commerce.
Because the statute regulated, discrimi-
nated against, and imposed an intolerable
burden on interstate commerce, the court
found the Wisconsin solid waste disposal
statute to be in violation of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
- by Marc Poston
MISSOURI
Mueller v. Missouri Hazardous Waste
Management Commission, 904 S.W.2d
552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
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Atlas Environmental Services, Inc., (AES)
applied for a hazardous waste facility permit
from the Missouri Department of Natural Re-
sources (MDNR). MDNR issued AES a draft
permit on March 29, 1991. MDNR held
public hearings which Mueller attended be-
fore granting AES an official permit on July
18, 1991. Mueller appealed the issuance
of the permit to the Missouri Hazardous
Waste Management Commission (Commis-
sion). The Commission issued an order con-
ditionally approving the permit after
modifying it and ordering MDNR to take
"remedial measures." The Commission re-
quired MDNR to revaluate AES's status as a
"habitual violator" and to re-assess response
capabilities and transportation routes around
the proposed site. MDNR completed the
"remedial measures" and the Commission
issued its final order affirming the MDNR per-
mit on May 21, 1993. Mueller appealed
to the Jasper County Circuit Court, which de-
nied the petition for review on May 10,
1994.
The Missouri Southem District Court of
Appeals held that the MDNR did not grant
the Commission the right to modify a hazard-
ous waste disposal permit. Accordingly, it
reversed the decision of the trial court and
remanded the case so that MDNR could
make the ultimate determination of the status
of the permit. The court based its holding on
its interpretation of the Missouri Hazardous
Waste Management Law (Act) and the pow-
ers and duties granted the Commission under
the Act. The court attempted to construe the
language of the Act broadly so as to allow
the "administrative machinery" to accomplish
the purpose of the Act. Nonetheless, the
court found that the legislature had not explic-
itly granted modification powers in this part
of the Act, while explicitly granting such
powers elsewhere. The court concluded that
the legislature had reserved such power from
the Commission in the Hazardous Waste
Management Facility Treatment and Storage
Permit application process.
The court touched on several other issues.
It held that the MDNR was within its rights
under the Act to contract with the Missouri
Department of Health to prepare a health
profile as required by the Act. It found that
the Act required the Commission to consider
environmental and geological information,
but the question of the extent to which the
Commission must consider the factors was
left unanswered. The court held that the
Commission and MDNR are limited to con-
sidering geologic and engineering data col-
lected in field work supervised by MDNR.
The court decided that the other points on
appeal were rendered moot, as they related
to the insufficiency of various specific compo-
nents of the permit application process. The
court felt that the specific points would be
resolved correctly upon reevaluation by
MDNR.
The ultimate effect of this decision was to
limit the options given to the Commission in
administrative appeals of Hazardous Waste
Management Facility Treatment and Storage
Permits. The Commission will retain jurisdic-
tion over such appeals but may only affirm or
reverse MDNR's decision to grant a permit.
- by Michael Hunter
MELP
